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According to previous literature, trait anxiety is related to the tendency to choose
safety options during risk decision-making, that is, risk avoidance. In our opinion,
anxious people’s risk preference might actually reflect their hypersensitivity to emotional
information. To examine this hypothesis, a decision-making task that could elicit the
framing effect was employed. The framing effect indicates that risk preference could be
modulated by emotional messages contained in the description (i.e., frame) of options.
The behavioral results have showed the classic framing effect. In addition, individual
level of trait anxiety was positively correlated with the framing effect size. However,
trait anxiety was not correlated with risk-avoidance ratio in any condition. Finally, the
relationship between anxiety and the framing effect remained significant after the level
of depression was also taken into account. The theoretical significance and the major
limitations of this study are discussed.
Keywords: decision-making, framing effect, trait anxiety, depression, risk avoidance
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety is a negative emotion characterized by anticipatory affective, cognitive and behavioral
responses towards a possible threat (Grupe and Nitschke, 2013). The concept of anxiety is
multifaceted including state anxiety and trait anxiety (Endler and Kocovski, 2001). State anxiety
refers to a transient level of physiological arousal and feelings of vigilance, dread, and tension;
on the other hand, trait anxiety reflects an individual’s disposition to experience anxiety-relevant
feelings or thoughts or to show anxiety-related behaviors (Spielberger et al., 1983; Bekker
et al., 2003). Both state and trait anxiety are linked with abnormal decision-making behavior.
Eisenberg et al. (1995) first discovered that the participants with higher level of trait anxiety
were overwhelmingly prone to choose safety options over risky options (i.e., risk avoidance).
Later, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found that the manipulation of increasing participants’
state anxiety level also resulted in a stronger tendency to avoid risk. The idea of linking anxiety
with risk avoidance has been confirmed by many follow-up studies (e.g., Wray and Stone, 2005;
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Maner and Schmidt, 2006; Giorgetta et al., 2012; for reviews,
see Hartley and Phelps, 2012; Paulus and Yu, 2012). Hartley and
Phelps (2012) summarized previous findings and concluded that:
“either heightened arousal to risky choice options or increased
interoceptive awareness of arousal responses (or an interaction of
the two) may lead anxious individuals to be more risk averse.”
Nevertheless, we would like to point out that “risk” is a
broad term that across different domains and may have caused
misunderstandings in the literature. Most notably, Schonberg
et al. (2011) remind their readers to be aware of the “gap”
between naturalistic risk (e.g., drug abuse and skydiving) and
economic risk. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology,
anxiety is an adaptive emotion that protects people from
potential dangers by guiding the attention toward threat-
relevant information (Stein and Bouwer, 1997; Nesse, 1999).
Therefore, it is not surprising that anxiety is inherently associated
with more conservative behavior when facing naturalistic risk.
Regarding economic risk, however, previous findings are more
heterogeneous (e.g., Mano, 1992; Hockey et al., 2000; Miu
et al., 2008; Tang et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015). For
instance, in a series of experiments, Mitte (2007) discovered
that the relationship between anxiety and risk-avoidance is
unstable, depending on the way of response format (verbal vs.
numerical). In our opinion, during economic decision-making,
anxiety influences risk preference by raising the sensitivity
to negative emotion (see also Browning et al., 2015). More
specifically, anxious people may not avoid the economic risk
per se, but the anticipatory negative emotion associated with the
possibility of a larger loss (Engelmann et al., 2015). That is to
say, anxiety and economic risk avoidance are not necessarily
connected.
In most decision-making tasks, the risky options are related to
stronger emotional reactions (Loewenstein et al., 2001), thus it is
very difficult to distinguish the role of risk and that of emotion.
We suggest that investigating the framing effect could shed light
on this issue. The term “framing effect” refers to a phenomenon
that people are more likely to choose the option framed (e.g.,
worded) in an emotionally positive way, but are less likely to do
so when the same option is framed in a negative way (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981). Positive or negative emotion generated by
the “frame” elicits approach or avoidance behaviors, respectively
(Fagley et al., 2010). The framing effect was first discovered in
the naturalistic rather than the economic domain, that is, the
Asian disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Peng
et al. (2014) have found that high trait-anxious participants were
more likely to avoid risk when dealing with the Asian disease
problem. However, Peng et al. (2014) investigated the effect of
the self-frame (i.e., subjectively constructing the information in
an ambiguous situation). Therefore, their study is unsuitable to
test the hypothesis that trait anxiety is associated with heightened
sensitivity to external emotional information. In the context of
economic decision-making, De Martino et al. (2006) found that
people prefer choosing the safety option when it is framed as a
potential gain compared to when it is framed as a potential loss.
In our opinion, the paradigm developed by De Martino et al.
(2006) provides an opportunity to modulate the emotional effect
independent of economic risk.
In one of our recent studies, Xu et al. (2013) reported that
the level of trait anxiety [measured by Spielberger’s Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI-T); see Spielberger et al., 1983] was correlated
with the framing effect size. Anxious people are more likely to
choose the safety option when it is described as a gain, but
less likely to do so when it is described as a loss, indicating
that they are more susceptible to emotional information when
making decisions. This idea is supported by brain-imaging
findings that trait anxiety was correlated with activations of
the amygdala, which is a key region in the emotional circuit
(Xu et al., 2013). However, it remains unclear if anxiety level
is consistently related to economic risk avoidance regardless of
how the options are framed. In addition, the reliability of the
findings of Xu et al. (2013) is harmed by its relatively small
sample size (20 participants in total). Regarding the importance
of reproducibility in psychological research (e.g., Open Science
Collaboration, 2015), the experiment should be replicated in a
larger sample.
Finally, the close relationship between anxiety and depression
should be taken into account (Stavrakaki and Vargo, 1986).
Depression is characterized by feeling of low mood, sadness,
and loss of interest, and can be recognized as either a state or
a cluster of symptoms (Zung, 1965; Rottenberg, 2005). Anxiety
and depression overlap with each other in many aspects such
as the component of negative affect (Lonigan et al., 1994;
Joiner et al., 1996). Also, in the field of clinical psychology,
anxiety and depressive disorders are highly comorbid (Domschke
and Dannlowski, 2010). Therefore, it is recommended that the
research on anxiety should control the effect of depression as
a confounding variable (Beuke et al., 2003). Seeing that the
current study investigates trait anxiety rather than state anxiety,
we used Zung’s self-rating depression scale (SDS) to measure the
depression level, because the SDS estimates depressive symptoms
in a prolonged period (Zung, 1965). According to Xu et al. (2013),
the SDS score was not significantly correlated with the framing
effect size. However, considering the high correlation between
anxiety and depression (r= 0.3∼0.7 in many studies, e.g., Knight
et al., 1983; Bjelland et al., 2002; r= 0.53 in the sample of Xu et al.,
2013), more rigorous statistical methods are needed to examine
the potential influence of depression on the data.
This study employed a new sample to complete the task
designed by De Martino et al. (2006), which could reliably elicit
the classic framing effect during risk decision-making (Roiser
et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2013). Individual levels of trait anxiety and
depression were measured and entered into behavioral analyses.
Our hypotheses were: (a) the level of trait anxiety would be
positively correlated with the framing effect size, but not the
tendency of risk avoidance; (b) taking depression into account
would not affect the relationship between anxiety and the framing
effect.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixty-nine students from Beijing Normal University participated
in the study. A total of six participants were excluded from
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data analysis due to failure to complete all the questionnaires
or participation discontinuation. As a result, the final sample
consisted of data from 63 participants (34 female). Informed
consents were obtained from all participants. The experimental
protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee at Beijing
Normal University.
The Chinese version of STAI-T was used to assess the
level of trait anxiety. The Chinese version of SDS was used
to assess self-reported symptoms of depression. Both scales
have demonstrated internal consistency, convergent validity, and
discriminate validity (STAI-T: Spielberger et al., 1983; Shek, 1993;
SDS: Zung et al., 1965; Shu, 1993).
Procedure
Before the experiment, participants received the instruction
about the formal task and were given 12 practice trials. They
were also informed that their task performance (i.e., total points)
would contribute to final payment. The relationship between
point thresholds and corresponding participant payment was
shown on a table, which indicated that the range of possible
earning was 20–100 Chinese Yuan.
Figure 1 provides schematic illustration of a single trial. In
the beginning of each trial, participants were shown a message
screen (2 s) indicating an initial amount of reward (starting
points: for instance, “You receive 100 points” in Chinese). There
were four different starting point amounts (25, 50, 75, and 100
points), which were counterbalanced across conditions. However,
participants would not actually get the reward before they make
a decision between a “sure” and a “gamble” option, which
appeared following the starting point presentation. The sure
(safety) option indicates the amount of points that could be kept
for certain if participants choose this option, while the gamble
(risky) option indicates a win-or-nothing choice. Within each
trial, the expected values of the sure and gamble options were
identical and mathematically equivalent between conditions. The
only difference between conditions was the description of the
sure option; this option was described as money retained in the
gain (positive) frame condition (e.g., “keep 80 points” of 100
points) but was described as money lost in the loss (negative)
frame condition (e.g., “lose 20 points” of 100 points). In both
conditions, the gamble option was presented identically as a
FIGURE 1 | Schematic diagram of a trial. (A) The gain frame condition.
(B) The loss frame condition.
pie chart depicting the probability of winning and losing in
green and red color, respectively. There were four kinds of
winning probabilities (20, 40, 60, and 80%) for the gamble
option. Participants chose between the two options by pressing
the F and J buttons on the keyboard (“F” for the option on the
left side and “J” for the right side). The decision screen them
disappeared immediately, which was followed by the next trial.
No feedback was provided during the task (see De Martino et al.,
2006; Xu et al., 2013, for more details). All experimental variables
(including starting point amounts, positions of the two options,
and winning probabilities) were fully counterbalanced between
conditions.
The task was divided into two identical sessions comprised
of 64 trials (32 gain frame and 32 loss frame; ordered
pseudorandomly). At the end of the task, total earned points
were displayed to participants. Stimulus display and behavioral
data acquisition were conducted using E-Prime software 1.1
(Psychology Software Tools).
Data Analysis
The framing effect in the current study was quantitatively
defined as the difference between trials in which participants’
decisions were consistent with the frame (chose the sure option
in the gain frame condition or the gamble option in the loss
frame condition) and trials in which participants’ decisions ran
counter to the frame (chose the gamble option in the gain
frame condition or the sure option in the loss frame condition).
Accordingly, the framing effect size was calculated as follows:
(Gainsure + Lossgamble) – (Gaingamble + Losssure) (De Martino
et al., 2006).
Two-tailed one-sample t-test was used to examine the
significance of the framing effect. Pearson correlation analysis
(two-tailed) was used to determine the relationship between
the framing effect and both anxiety and depression. Finally,
linear regression analysis was performed to assess the unique
contribution of anxiety.
For all the analyses, the results of descriptive statistics were
reported as mean ± SD. The significance level was set at
p = 0.05. In addition, the bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa)
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were estimated based
on bootstrapping with 5000 simulations (Efron, 1987). Statistical
analysis was performed using IBM SPSS 19.0 (IBM Corporation).
RESULTS
Self-Report Measures
In the whole sample, the STAI-T score was 38.25 ± 7.06 (range:
26–55) and the SDS score was 37.13 ± 9.37 (range: 23–54).
The Pearson correlation (two-tailed) between two scales was
significant (r = 0.292, p= 0.021, 95% CI [0.081,0.496]).
Behavioral Results
The one-sample t-test revealed that the framing effect was
significantly larger than zero (21.87 ± 20.20, t(62) = 8.594,
p < 0.001); participants were more likely to make decisions
in accordance with the frame (Gainsure = 53.37%,
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FIGURE 2 | (A) A scatter plot of the correlation between STAI-T score and the framing effect size (p = 0.010). (B) A scatter plot of the correlations between STAI-T
score and the ratio of choosing the sure option in the gain frame and the loss frame conditions (ps > 0.327).
Lossgamble = 58.02%) rather than counter to the frame
(Gaingamble = 46.63%, Losssure = 41.98%).
Pearson correlation analysis revealed a positive correlation
between the STAI-T score and the framing effect (r = 0.321,
p = 0.010, 95% CI [0.095,0.520]) (Figure 2A). In contrast,
the STAI-T score was not correlated with the risk-avoidance
tendency (i.e., the ratio of choosing the sure option) in either
the gain frame condition (r = 0.061, p = 0.637, 95% CI
[–0.163,0.274]) or the loss frame condition (r= –0.125, p= 0.327,
95% CI [–0.347,0.107]) (Figure 2B). In addition, these effects
were not sensitive to the amount of starting points or winning
probabilities (results not showed for brevity). The SDS score was
not significantly correlated with the framing effect (r = 0.212,
p= 0.098, 95% CI [–0.005,0.414]), or the risk-avoidance tendency
in the gain frame condition (r = –0.089, p = 0.492, 95% CI
[–0.349,0.175]) or that in the loss frame condition (r = –0.199,
p= 0.121, 95% CI [–0.428,0.041]).
Finally, a linear regression analysis was used to explain the
framing effect based on the STAI-T and SDS scores (entered
method). The regression model was significant [F(2,59) = 4.136,
p = 0.021, R2 = 0.123]. Whereas the STAI-T score was a
significant predictor of the framing effect (β = 0.805, p = 0.018,
95% CI [0.129,1.504]), the SDS score was not (β = 0.266,
p= 0.309, 95% CI [–0.268, 0.752]).
DISCUSSION
Consistent with Xu et al. (2013), the current study has found a
positive correlation between the level of trait anxiety (measured
by STAI-T) and the framing effect size. That is, the influence
of the description of the safety option on individual risk
preference increased as a function of trait anxiety. These results
indicate that people with high trait anxiety are more sensitive
to the influence of contextual emotional information during risk
decision-making. Consequently, their decisions are more likely
to be in accord with the framing effect compared to those with
low trait anxiety (Xu et al., 2013). In addition, the results of
linear regression analysis have confirmed the independent role
of trait anxiety after the depression factor (measured by SDS) was
considered.
In contrast, the current study showed no evidence of the
relationship between trait anxiety and economic risk avoidance,
regardless of whether the safety option was framed as a potential
gain or a potential loss. We suggest that trait anxiety and
economic risk avoidance are not necessarily associated in certain
circumstances, especially when incidental emotions generated by
external information affect anxious people’s judgment. This idea
is supported by one of our recent studies which discovered that
during risk decision-making, the neural responses to feedback
presentation were stronger under the influence of emotional
facial expression in anxious participants compared to their
non-anxious counterparts (Wang et al., 2016). As described in
the Introduction, many studies have reported that the level of
trait anxiety is consistently related to risk avoidance (Hartley
and Phelps, 2012; Paulus and Yu, 2012). One should be very
cautious if he/she would like to re-interpret the previous findings
according to our theory, seeing that the current study has only
examined one specific decision-making task. In our opinion,
the key point of this study is that the relationship between
trait anxiety and risk avoidance could be manipulated by the
emotional context.
The possible mechanisms that connect trait anxiety with
the framing effect should be discussed. At the physiological
level, one of the major characteristics of anxiety is physiological
hyperarousal (Joiner et al., 1996). It is possible that anxious
individuals are more likely to be driven by emotional arousal
during decision-making (Mano, 1992). As a result, their decision
tends to be in accordance with the valence of emotional
information, that is, making approach or avoidance responses
under the influence of positive or negative emotion, respectively.
At the brain level, trait anxiety magnitude is associated with
structural and functional differences in the brain that may affect
cognitive performance (Kuhn et al., 2011). Among the brain
areas that are sensitive to trait anxiety level, the amygdala
and the prefrontal cortex are most often highlighted (Kim and
Whalen, 2009; Comte et al., 2015; Greening and Mitchell, 2015).
According to Xu et al. (2013), trait anxiety level was positively
correlated with amygdala-based “emotional” system activation
when decisions were consistent with the framing effect, but
negatively correlated with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)-
based “analytic” system activation when decisions ran counter
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to the framing effect. It is thus possible that trait anxiety affects
risk decision-making by modulating the activity of the brain
networks being involved in the task. However, we should keep
in mind that the major findings of this study were derived from
correlation analyses. Strictly speaking, the direction of the causal
relationship between trait anxiety and the framing effect remains
undetermined.
The final part of this paper is about the limitations of the
current study. First, regarding the high correlation between
STAI-T and STAI-S scores (r≈0.8 in many studies; e.g., Wu
et al., 2013), this study only collected STAI-T data. Seeing
that trait anxiety and state anxiety are qualitatively distinct,
follow-up research is necessary to examine the impact of state
anxiety on the framing effect. Second, consistent with the
task design in De Martino et al. (2006), only the description
of the safety option, but not that of the risky option, was
different between frame conditions. We did not change the
original task because it reliably elicits the framing effect (see
Introduction). Nevertheless, it would be interesting to check
whether individual preference to the risky option would also
be affected by the frame, and whether this effect would be
sensitive to anxiety. Third, we predict that in naturalistic
scenarios (e.g., the Asian disease problem), the relationship
between anxiety and risk avoidance would not be overshadowed
by the framing effect, but this idea was untested in the current
study.
In a word, the current study indicates that the relationship
between trait anxiety and risk decision-making is more
complicated than what previous literature suggested, and further
research is still needed to explore this issue.
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